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IN THE SUPRE~vIE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\

DON .FOSTER,

Plaintiff and Respondent, ~

.f

VS.

f

ELMO J. STEED, an indi\'i(lual,
GORDON G. \VHEELRR, au iu- :
1
dividual; ELMO .T. STEED and ·
GORDON G. \VHEELEH dba S
& \V TEXACO SER\TICE, a partnership and TEXACO, INC., a
corporation,
Def c11rlrmts,

No.

10685

TEXACO, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

1

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\IENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Texaco, Inc., appeals from the
denial of its motion for summary judgment by the
Honorable ]3ryaut H. Croft, District .Judge. The
1

appeal is on interlocutory order granted by this Court
on 28 July 1966.

DISPOSITION IX lAYNEll COURT
On September 3rd, I!J(;;'), the respondent Don
Foster filed suit in the District Court of Salt Lake
County against Elmo J. Steed and Gordon '\Theeler
as individuals and partners, and against their partnership S & W Texaco Senice (R. 1). Suit was also
brought against Texaco, luc. The suit was for damages
in compensation for burn injuries sustained by the
respondent at th eS &
Texaco Service, Inc., in Bountiful, Utah on lVIay 21, 1964 (R. 1-3). Answer was
filed by the partnership and the individual defendants,
however, the record does not reJiect that Texaco, Inc.,
the appellant herein, ever filed an answer to respondent's complaint. Subsequently, interrogatories were
served and depositions taken by all parties. On October
22, 1965, the appellant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on behalf of .Texaco, Inc. (R. 16). The
matter was heard on the 29th day of .March, 1966, and
memorandums were submitted b? the parties. On July
15, 1966, Judge Croft entered an order denying the
appellant's motion for summar~r judgment on the
grounds:

'\T

" ... it cannot be said that there is no genuine
issue as to anv material fact or facts concerning
the relationsl{ip between Texaco, Inc. and the
other defendants in the operation of the service
station here involved. and in the opinion of the

additional factors helpful in determining
the issue can be more fully dveloped by evidence
and testimony upon trial."
cou~t,

On July 13, 1965, two days before entry of the
trial court's order, the appellant filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal. On July 28, 1965, this Court
issued its order allowing the appeal.
RELIEF SOuGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the interlocutory appeal
should be dismissed as improvidently granted, or that
the trial court's decision should be affirmed and the
case remanded for trial with all parties being given an
opportunity to be heard.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement
of facts as being more in keeping with the rule that
the evidence under circumstances like those in the instant
case will be viewed in a light most favorable to the trial
court's judgment.(1)
The respondent, Don Foster, is a thirty-year-old
father of three children, and a self-employed stone
mason. (F 3, 4). On May 21, 1964<, he entered the S &
"\i\T Texaco Service Station in Bountiful, Utah at about
(1) The record will be cited as R, ~le? •:lcposition of respon~E'.nt,
Don Foster, a.<o F, th" deposition pf J\Tr. S1c·,•cl 3S S, 1he depos1t10n
of Mr. Whcele1· i.lS v,r, and 1hc (1ClJOS;'i· r; ·Jr r.1r. Simmons of
Texaco as T.

J

6 :30 P .lH. ( F 6, 7). He helped push a Plymouth automobile into the station garage. 1\fr. Wheeler, a partner
in the service station operation, or one of his assistants
asked the respondent to prime the carburetor of the
car by pouring gas into it. They assured him it would
not explode. ( F 8, 9) . Respondent complied with the
request. The gasoline ignited, setting respondent on
fire. He jumped back and tripped on a pan of gasoline
on the floor of the service station, filled with gasoline
and being used to clear parts. ( F. 11) . As a result, the
respondent sustained serious burns for which the instant
action was commenced .

.J\!Ir. Foster, in his deposition, testified that there
was a large Texaco sign at the station, and that a sign
over the station read "S &
Texaco Service". (F. 19).

"r

The depositions of Gordon G. 'Vheeler and Elmo
J. Steed were taken by the plaintiff. Mr. Steed indicated that he had been with Texaco stations for about
twenty years, and in addition to the station involved
in the instant litigation, he was operating another
Texaco station under his own name. ( S. 6). He stated
that as between he and lVIr. 'Vheeler there were no
articles of partnership, nor had a notice of doing business under an assumed name been filed with the Secretary of State. (S. 5). He stated that Mr. 'Vheeler
had gone to a school conducted by Texaco for about
30 days shortly after they started to operate the station. ( S. 7). At the school, training hints and safety
instructions were given. ( S. 7), and Texaco was always
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"giving you instructions on safety . . . . " (S. 7). He
stated that using gasoline to clean parts would bf_:
contrary to Texaco instructions. ( S. 10). He i11<licated
that Texaco personnel came around regularly at the
station, and that after the fire they painted the station
(S. 11).<1)
l\Ir. Wheeler testified that he was one of the persons
running the S & \V Texaco station. A lease with Texaco
had been executed on May 28, 1962 ( \\r. 4, 5, Exhibit
A, R. 51).

Mr. VVheeler indicated he attended a school for
thirty days conducted by Texaco at Murray, Utah (W.
5, 24). At the school he was given safety instruction
and thought there probably was instruction on the use
of gasoline as a cleaning agent (R. 24). At the time
of taking .Mr. 'Vheeler's deposition, counsel for appellant and vVheeler refused to allow 'Vheeler to discuss
whether Texaco had placed any restrictions on the
length of time the station could be closed. Further, a
copy of an agreement terminating the lease with Texaco
was never produced at the time that 'Vheeler's deposition was taken (W. 29) <2 ) Mr. 'Vheeler indicated
Texaco would send people around regularly and these
( 1) At this poin: co1~n"'1 :.,r aprell~rnt an'l Ste'":1 ins'.ructed
hin1 not to c1ns1i'/er 2~1J fur;_ncr c:i__1csti 1l1S, L1kint~ lhe position
that evidence of subseqt1en >. c:1a:'.1_!,?S w '5 1~ot :< YJ.issible. While
this is true if foe evidence; lS 10 ohow rYi'l" ;-ic_:,ligence, it is not
so if it shows the cx'cen: of v111" i o1 by Te:;::a"~o. 1· ~cCormick Evidence P. 544 (1954); :U11hc:n0~,._ c::i '-'· Howar'.1 Savings Inst., 124
N.JL 368 12A2d 384 (1941).
(2) This agrcC'rncnt is ;i]o:o nc.:. a p~ ,., of the rcc:i£d on appeal,
;ilthough tt"'l"C is ~-o;_-c cvidcnJ' ii: \\;cs ::d\FC ihc Court below.
(R.38).

5

people would observe the cleanliness and operation of
the station ( W. 34) , and also Texaco provided marketing information (W. 34). The only gasoline pumps
on the premises were those with a Texaco trademark
( T. 22) . Mr. Wheeler understood his lease could Le
broken at any itme by either party, or continue as long
as the parties wanted (W. 5).

l\Ir. \Vorth \V. Simmons, the Division Service
Representative of Texaco, had established criteria for
obtaining operators for their stations ( T. 4). He also
indicated each applicant must be analyzed by Texaco
and that two men from Texaco had approved \Vheeler
( T. 4). He indicated that normally Texaco would supply all gasoline products for a station as well as provide
tires and accessories ( T. 6-8). Further, Texaco encourages the wearing of a Texaco uniform ( T. 8).
\¥heeler wore such a uniform (T. 9). Mr. Simmons
indicated that he had inspected the station to see if it
was clean (T. 10), and further the premises would be
inspected to see if they were safe because Texaco had
an obligation to maintain the building (T. 10, 11). In
addition to the lease, a products sales agreement was
entered into (R. 53, Exhibit P-3). This agreement was
not available to counsel at the time Mr. Simmons' deposition was taken (T. 7, 8).
Mr. Simmons indicated Texaco gave marketing
help ( T. 19) , and encouraged the opera tor to buy from
Texaco and that it was customary for an operator to
obtain his needs from Texaco ( T. 20). He indicated
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Texaco would "try to sell" the operator on meeting
Texaco standards, and a lease might be cancelled if
they were not met (T. 21).
The lease between Texaco and Steed and 'Vheeler
(Exhibit A, R. 51), provided it was cancellable at will,
that lessee would not leave the station vacant for over
48 hours, lessee was to maintain the premises in good
repair and in a "safe condition", and that assignment
or sublease could not occur without the permission of
Texaco. The sales agreement ( R. 53, Exhibit P. :J) ,
provided for a maximum delivery of gasoline, proYided
for 30 days notice of termination, but would terminate
on cancellation of the lease. The purchaser, 'Vheeler
and Steed, could not sell products purchased from
others under Texaco's trademark, nor mix or co-mingle
products. The only pumps and signs at the station were
marked Texaco. The manner of delivery of the gasoline
was specified, and the operators were required to comply with applicable federal rules of the Surgeon General
on handling tetra ethyl lead gasoline, and instruct
its employees.
All the appellant's witnesses testified Texaco did
not set hours of operation, or control the hiring or
firing of personnel, require reports or prevent purchasing products from other sources.

7

POINT I
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DIS.MISSED
AS I.MPROYIDENTLY GRANTED.
Rule 72 (b) U.R.C.P. provides for appeals from
interlocutory orders. In this case appellant seeks review
from the denial of its motion for summary judgment,
although no answer was filed, at the time of taking the
depositions important documents were not available to
counsel, the depositions and other evidence does not
reflect extensive treatment of the question of the relationship between Texaco and other defendants, and
counsel, during the depositions, refused to allow inquiry
into relevant matters. It is submitted that in this posture
the record is not ripe for consideration of the issue of
whether summary judgment should have been granted.
In Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah :.?d 251, 351 P2d fi:Z-t
( 1960) , this Court handed down a landmark decision
on summary judgment. However, the facts of that
case seem to clearly show. a full and thorough treatment
of the issues. Several pages of the opinion demonstrate
the exhaustive exploration of the issues and indicate
the fact that if full consideration has been given to
an issue in the discovery process, it may be ripe for
determination if there is no genuine issue of fact. This
Court observed:
"Rule 56 U.R.C .P. is not intended to provide
a substitute for the regular trial of cases in which
there are disputed issues of fact upon which the
outcome of the litigation depends. And it should
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be invoked with caution to the end that litigants
may be afforded a trial where there exists between them a bona fide dispute of material fact.
However, where the moving party's e"\'identiary
material is in itself sufficient and the opposing
party fails to proffer any evi<lentiary matter
when he is presumably in a position to do so,
the courts should be justified in concluding that
no genuine issue of fact is present, nor would
one be present at the trial."
Iu this case a reading of the record and briefs of
the parties discloses issues of fact, and that the depositions when taken were not complete treatments of
the issue. No answer had been filed by the appellant.
Appellant has only interrogated one witness of the
respondent, and then with little view to the issue now
before the court. Obviously, the record, which is possibly incomplete, does not provide a proper posture
for review by this Court. See, Note on Dupler v. Yates,
7 Utah L. Rev. 251 (1961). In, Leininger v. StearnsRoger Manufacforing Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P2d 33
( 1965) , this Court, speaking through .Judge Ruggeri,
stated:
"Summary judgment is not a substitute for
trial, but is rather a jw:Jicial search for determining whether genuine issues exist as to material facts."
In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17
Utah 2d 420, 413 P2d 807 (1966), this Court acknowledged that summary judgment was a harsh measure
and should be sparingly used, also .Justice '"' ade contended that since the Dupler decision the Court had
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unwarrantedly expanded the effect of Rule 56, U.R.C.P. It is therefore sullmiltcd U1at this case should not
be considered ripe for stunmary judgment because of the
absence of such discovery as would allow a conclusion
that the trial court shoul<l have ruled to the contrary.
In Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P2d
177 ( 1961), this ourt stated with reference to the purpose for interlocutory review:
"The purpose to be serYed in granting an interlocutory appeal is to get directly at and dispose of the issues as quickly as possible consistent
with thoroughness and efficiency in the administration of justice. llut that objective is not always served by granting such an appeal. In
some instances, the necessity of remanding for
trial may result in protracting rather than shortening the litigation. For this reason, whenever
it appears likely that the matters in dispute can
be finally disposed of upon a trial; or where they
may become moot; or where they can, without
involving any serious difficulty, abide determination in the event of an appeal after the trial,
the desired objective is best served by refusing
to entertain an interlocutory appeal and letting
the case proceed to trial. Then, if an appeal is
necessary, there is this additional advantage: the
issues of facts have been determined and the
record is viewed in the light most favorable to
the judgment, instea(l of the reverse."
It is submitted that the record in this case, when
viewed in light of the objectives of interlocutory appeal,
does not justify the Court in reviewing the issues raised.
The respondent is not attempting to reargue the ques-
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tion of whether interlocutory appeal should be granted,
but rather is saying that now that the record is actually
before the Court, instead of the statements of counsel.
the case does not appear to be in a proper posture for
review and the appeal should be dismissed as having
been improperly granted.
The trial Court found conflict of fact, and was
apparently also of the opinion that discovery had not
developed the case sufficient to allow a summary judgment proceeding to determine the issues between the
parties. In a similar instance the United States Supreme
Court has felt the case was not ripe for interlocutory
review. 111 Su.:it.~erland Cheese Association v. E.
Horne,s Market, Inc., ____ US ____ , 87 S. Ct. 193 (Nov.
7, 1966) , the Court ruled that an order denying summary judgment was not the type of interlocutory order
allowing for intermediate review. It observed:
"'Ve take the other view not because "interlocutory" or preliminary may not at times embrace denials of permanent injunctions, but
because the denial of a motion for summary
judgment because of unresolved issues of fact
does not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim. It is strictly
a pretrial order that decides only one thingthat the case should go to trial. Orders that in no
way touch on the merits of the claii:i but o:ily
relate to pretrial procedures are not m our view
"interlocutory" within the meaning of § 1292
(a) ( l). ,;v~ see no othe~ way to protect .the
integrity of the congressional policy agamst
piecemeal appeals".
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It is respectfully submitted that this appeal should
be dismissed as improvidently granted.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES SUFFICIENT FACTUAL ISSUES AS "\VARRANT
TRIAL AND THE RECORD DISCLOSES EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A JURY
QUESTION AS TO TEXACO'S LIABILITY.
It is well settled that summary judgment will not
lie if there are conflicts in the facts of a case which
would allow a jury to make a determination in favor
of either party. Thus, in Controlled Receivables, Inc.
v. Harrnan, Supra, this Court observed:

"A motion for summary judgment is a harsh
measure, and for this reason plaintiff's contentions must be considered in a light most to his
advantage and all doubts resolved in favor of
permitting him to go to trial; and only if when
the whole matter is so viewed, he could, nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, should the
motion be granted."
Ct. Bridge v. Back1nan, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P2d
909 (1960).
It is of course well stablished that a person is not
normally liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor, Restatement, Torts 2nd ~ 409. Further it
is equally well settled that determination of whether
a person is an independent contractor or an employee
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is to a great extent a matter of the control exercised
or capable of exercise by the party sought to be held
for the act of another. Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah
12, 207 P2d 809 ( 1949) ; Ouerhansly v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 5 Utah 2d 15, 29.5 P2d 1093 (1956). Further,
many courts have taken opposite positions on the issue
of whether an oil company is liable for negligence of
a service station operator acting under the trade name
or sponsorship of the oil company. Anno. 83 ALR2d
1282.
The special marketing structure of the retail gasoline and oil business makes the traditional concepts of
agency and independent contractor difficult of application. Often the marketing arrangement is based on
anti-trust problems and avoiding unprofitable business
arrangements rather than factors relevant to determining tort liability. See Anno. 83 ALR 1282, 1284<.
Further, it is submitted that the trend of cases is towards
recognizing that the business relationship between an oil
company and retail seller should not necessarily be the
determinative factor in adjudicating tort liability, but
the realities of the relationship should be appraised to
see if the relationship is one where the oil company
should be held responsible.
The facts of this case, when viewed most favorable
to the plaintiff's case, quite clearly present a question
for resolution at trial. The appellant had a responsibility for making certain the building was properly
maintained ( T. IO). Safety inspections of the premises
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were ma<le by representatiws of Texaco (T. 10). Aftc;·
the fire, Texaco eff ecte<l the needed repairs (to the
extent the record allows in view of appellant's counsel's
instruction not to answer such questions). Texaco encouraged 'Vheeler and others to wear the Texaco uniform, which 'Vheeler did. If the station were not properly maintained, the rights of VVheeler could be summarily terminated similar to an employee. Texaco
encouraged the operator to identify with its product.
The only pumps on the station premises bore the Texaco
trademark, and sale of any other product under the
Texaco trademark was forbidden. The manner and
nature of delivery of products was under Texaco's
control. It was customary for the operators to buy all
items for sale from Texaco (T. 20). Texaco set up
criteria for operators, and in effect hired them rather
than negotiated with them. Operators went to a Texaco
school where they received instruction on marketing,
operations and safety instruction. Regular visits were
made by Texaco personnel to inspect and service the
needs of the station. There were no articles of partnership between Steed and 'Vheeler, nor had they ever
bothered to file a statement of doing business under
a fictitious name< 1). All documents evidencing the
relationship of the parties were prepared by Texaco
on standard forms. A large Texaco sign was the mn,ior
evidence to the public of the company running the
station. The only other sign on the premises-S & 'V
(1) This fac'r would ;y0clude rr•J~ecu 1 j0;1 of a suit ind~pend~ntly
by Steed and Wheeler if they wc;-e in fac~~domg busmess mdependently, 42-2-10, Ut::ih C0dr- ,\wn. l 9~·.:i
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Texaco Senice-seemed to clearly show Texarn's involvement in the operation of the station. The format
and desigu of the station were in accord with Texaco
standards. Finally, the lease between Steed, \Vheeler
and Texaco required the former to keep the premises
in a "clean, safe, and healthful condition". Taking
all of these facts together, it is obvious that a jury
question exists, and a jury would be acting reasonably
in finding liability against Texaco based upon the full
extent of the relationship and involvement of the appellant. Restatement of .•{qency, 2nd § 220 and Intro.
note Ch. 7, Top. 2, Tit. B.
Under circumstances similar to those above, many
courts hai,'e found the relationship between an oil com·
pany and a service station to be of such a nature that
the oil company should be held liable for the torts of
the service station personnel, Anno. 116 ALR 4<57;
Anno. 83 ALR2d 1282.
InBoronsk~ v. The 'l'exas Company, 183 NE2d
127 (Mass. 1962), an arrangement under a lease similar to that in the instant case was held to impose liability
upon the Texas Company for damage sustained by
plaintiff from leaking gasoline on the premises of the
service station. A claim comparable to that now made
by Texaco was rejected by the Massachusetts Court.
The court found the evidence sufficient to submit to
the jury.< 1)
( 1) The case also points up another errM which occurred during
the taking of the depositions when counsel for both def~ndant
parties contended that the documents could .not be van~d by
parol evidence. Of course, such a parol evidence rule 1s not
applicable to third parties.
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A recent Califoruia case, Gonzales v. Derrinytu11,
10 Cal. Rptr. 700 ( 1961), the court discussed the cases
in detail in which liability had been imposed again:it
the station owner. The court held that since the company maintained reasonable control over the manner
of delivery of the gasoline and the nature of the operations of its distributor, a factual question for the jury
to resolve was presented and the jury's determination
would not be upset on appeal.
ln Humble Oil and llefininy Co. v. Martin, 148
Tex. 175, 222 S\V2d 995 (1949), the court ruled the
oil company was liable when a filling station attendant
negligently allowed a car to roll down an incline and
strike the plaintiff. The filling station operator exercised control over the hiring and firing of personnel,
but the relationship of the oil company was held to
raise a sufficient issue of control as to warrant the
matter being submitted to the jury. The court distinguished other Texas cases on their facts. In the instant
case, safety inspection was made by Texaco. Texaco
did set a requirement that the station could not be
closed for a period in excess of 48 hours, and generally
exercised some degree of control over the station so
that it could have corrected unsafe practices.
A similar conclusion that the question was one for
the jury was reached in Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry,
241 Ala. 62, 1 So 2d 29 (1941), where the court relied
upon the fact that Standard Oil reall~T advertised itself
at the station. A similar conclusion can be drawn from
the position of the Restatement of Torts 2nd § 429.
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In Edwards v. Gulf Oil Co., 69 Ga. App. 140,
~4 SE2d 843 ( 1943), the court ruled that a prima facie
case was made out against the oil company where the
operator wore a uniform bearing Gulf's name and insignia, and had Gulf signs on the pumps and building,
and passed out Gulf literature. The court ruled it error
to non-suit plaintiff against Gulf. Similar results were
reached by the Missouri Courts in R,ljan v. Standard
Oil Co., 144 SW2d 170 (Mo. App. 1940); and Brenner
v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524, 158
S'V2d 171 (1942}.
In Phillips Petro!eum Co. v. Hooper, 164 F2d
743 (5th Cir. 1947), the court applying Texas la1v
said the question of the liability of the company and
the issue of control was properly one for the jury to
determine.
In the instant case when the full extent of Texaco's
participation is viewed it is obvious the public would
feel the station was under Texaco supervision, which
it was, and that unsafe conditions on the premises would
not be tolerated. Under facts comparable to this case,
the only humane and proper result is to recognize that
a company may not sell under its trademark, give classes
of instruction on service station operation, make safetr
and other inspections, have right to terminate the
lessee's relationship at will, require that safe premises
be maintained, and then contend it owes no duty to
the station patrons. The cases cited by appellant are
in many instances distinguishable on their facts or
otherwise doctrinally opposed to reality.
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It is submitted the trial court's determinatiot1
should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The facts of this case and the posture of the record
on appeal require either the affirmance of the trial
court's ruling that the question of liability of appellant
should await trial, or that the case should be dismissed
on the grounds that the appeal was improvidentlr
granted. There are no circumstances warranting the
relief requested by appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, 1\1ECHA1\1 & PRATT
RONALD N. BOYCE
ROLAND R. vVRIGHT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent Don Foster.
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